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I. INTRODUCTION
An uninterrupted offer of evidence by an attorney during a
trial in North Carolina is a rare if not unknown experience in the
workday of a Superior Court Judge. At some stage of the proceed-
ings the legally abused and commonly misunderstood word "objec-
tion" will be interposed. Objections shatter the presentation of the
case being pursued by the offering counsel. Objections generally
generate delay, create discord, cause confusion when a novel point
is presented, and always require a response from the judge. Be-
cause the judge's response provides the roots for appeal, he, as well
as counsel, must be knowledgeable of the rules in dealing with im-
proper objections, such as those which lack merit, waste time,
needlessly change momentum, and serve to delay or harass.
An objection functions as a traffic control light. When oppos-
ing counsel does not consent to something being offered, the red
light of objection flashes. The proceedings stop. The party consid-
ers that the reception of testimony would violate some rule of evi-
dence, law or ethics, and he refers the subject matter to the judge
to decide admissibility, legality, and propriety, and to determine
whether or not the green light will shine for the stopped opponent
to proceed. "An objection," as defined by McIntosh, "is the formal
method of presenting to the court some question affecting the in-
terest of a party to the litigation and upon which a ruling of the
court is desired. .. ."
Making an objection serves various fundamental purposes:
"first, to keep from the record evidence which might prejudice the
jury, the trial judge or an appellate tribunal; secondly, to preserve
for review on appeal a contention that evidence was erroneously
admitted if the case is lost at the trial level."' 2 In addition, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has concluded that "[tihe purpose of an
objection in a trial is to call the court's attention to errors being
committed, so that the court, as well as the opposing party, will be
advised and have an opportunity to correct them. Such objections
1. 2 A. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES § 1531, at 59-
60 (2d ed. 1956).
2. L. ALLEN, ILLINOIS CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE, Illinois Institute for Continuing
Legal Education, Handbook No. 10, § 4.21, at 4-17 (1969).
[Vol. 4:339
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are not for the purpose of laying a predicate for a reversal of the
judgment on appeal, if the same should be unfavorable."'
The thesis of the Oklahoma Court must become vogue in
North Carolina. "Fairness to the trial judge," according to Busch,
"requires that all grounds supporting the objection be made known
to him, he is thus given a full opportunity to rule correctly."4 Full
application of this principle would enhance the integrity of the
trial process and would promote finality in the trial division. Re-
versals would and should result only from substantial error, and
not because of inconsequential technicalities in the mechanics of
objecting.5
The mechanics of objecting cause practical problems which
confront counsel on a daily basis. Counsel must first decide
whether to object at all. If he does decide to object, when should
the objection be made? Once the objection is made, should counsel
explain the basis of his objection, or hope that the shotgun ap-
proach will sufficiently pepper the record on appeal?
Once trial counsel has interposed an objection, the presiding
judge is confronted by an instant need to make many decisions. He
must decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection without a
hearing, whether to allow a tender offer, whether to send the jury
out, whether the question patently violates some rule of ethics that
calls for a mini-trial on counsel's conduct, whether to give reasons
for his rulings, whether an explanation of his ruling will draw accu-
sations from one of the counsel that he is quarterbacking for the
opponent, and whether to allow the answer for the record proper.
Those decisions must be made so frequently that there is no time
for leisure research.
During the hearing on objections thus generated, the specta-
tors in the courtroom will think that the howls, snarls and barks he
hears are those like unto a "dog-pound quarrel."6 Were there no
3. Ponca City Building and Loan Co. v. Graff, 189 Olka. 410, 414, 117 P.2d
514, 518 (1941).
4. F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 603, at 295 (1963).
5. A good article for study is R. ROPER & A. MzLONE, Does Procedural Pro-
cess Make a Difference?, 65 JUDICATURE 136 (1981).
6. 1 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 18, at 347 (3d ed. 1940). The title of this article is
suggested in the following comment of a Mr. Hearn on limiting the type of objec-
tions to the exclusion of evidence. "That proposal aims to do away with the pre-
sent orgies of technical and futile objections and to remove from our trials their
frequent semblance to a dog pound quarrel."
1982]
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exclusionary rules of evidence, there would be no need to object.
All exclusionary rules are technical. To the lay observer these tech-
nical discords seem to be futile, and act to obscure or prevent the
whole truth from emerging.
Admissibility is the first criterion for any evidence. Wigmore
has categorized the procedure for testing the question of admissi-
bility as having five parts: (1) the offer, (2) the objection, (3) the
ruling, (4) the exception, and (5) the judgment of error.7 Wigmore
likewise divides the objection into five parts: (1) the time, (2) the
form, (3) the tenor, (4) the waiver, and (5) the burden of proof.*
The key to admissibility does not lie always in the question.
The form or content of the question to which an objection was in-
terposed may be accurate, and yet the answer be wholly improper
and prejudicial. Objectionable answers call two related topics into
play: (1) motions to strike; and (2) requests for special instructions.
II. THE PROPRm OF OBMCTMONS
A. Timely Objections
A District Attorney once told me, "Most lawyers object when
the spirit moves them." Unfortunately, the spirit does not move all
lawyers at the proper time; the consequences of which may be de-
vastating. Unless an objection is timely, the right to object will be
lost by waiver.9 Once the right to object is lost by waiver, "[tihe
refusal of the court to exclude [the evidence] at a subsequent time
cannot be assigned as error, except where the evidence received is
made incompetent by some statutory provisions. 1 0
For an objection to be timely, it must be made as soon as prac-
tical. "As soon as practical" can vary from as soon as counsel
speaks one-half of the question to the moment the witness utters
the answer. Ordinarily, counsel should not make the objection un-
til the question has been completed."' If the beginning words tele-
graph excludable subject matter, however, the quick objection may
be the only way to prevent a mistrial. "To require completion of
the question as a rigid rule is to encourage trial by insinuation."12
7. Id. § 17, at 313.
8. Id. § 18 at 323.
9. 1 D. STANSBuRY, NoRTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 27, at 69 (Brandis rev.
1973).
10. 2 A. MCINToSH, supra note 1, § 1532, at 61.
11. State v. Sherron, 4 N.C. App. 386, 166 S.E.2d 836 (1969).
12. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 9, § 27, at 69 n.21.
[Vol. 4:339342
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B. The Tenor of the Objection
The big bother at trial usually comes in the tenor of the objec-
tion. In this context, tenor means ". .. either [an objection] de-
clares generally that the offered evidence is inadmissible, or it de-
clares specifically that the evidence violates a named principle or
rule of evidence."1 Thus, there are two kinds of objections: (1)
general,1 4 and (2) specific, or special.' 5 The puzzle for the lawyer is,
to paraphrase Hamlet, to make or not to make, a specific objection.
The words "I object" are as general a challenge as can be
made, "' and indicate that any port in a storm will do, if in fact a
port is available. "The general objection is one that states that
something is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial."17 Although
the general objection has its limitations, it does give all partici-
pants time to think; following a brief respite counsel may advance
specific reasons for his objection. In addition, the general objection
will be recorded as being timely, and it should signal the offering
counsel that he may be committing some error. Counsel should not
totally rely on a general objection, however, because:
[v]ery often the evidence is competent, relevant, and material to
the issue, but the witness is incompetent to testify to it or a foun-
dation has not been laid for its introduction. In such case the gen-
eral objection would, of course, fail. A specific objection aimed at
the incompetence of the witness, or at the omitted foundation,
must be made to serve as a basis for the court's ruling at trial and
to preserve the record on appeal.1'
Professor Charles Gamble reports that "... the most current
and popular test for determining the sufficiency of a general objec-
tion is that of whether the evidence admitted is illegal for any pur-
pose and cannot be made legal by other evidence or by otherwise
framing the inquiry." 9 Gamble then says that the test should be
13. 1 J. WIGMOSE, supra note 6, § 18, at 332.
14. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evmzrcz § 52, at 115-117 (2d
ed. 1972). General objections have also been termed 'sheet lightning' objections
and might be called 'masked battery' objections.
15. 6 AM. Jut. TRALms § 9, at 616 (1967).
16. "Probably the all time record for generality of objection was set by the
Kansas lawyer who objected 'on all the grounds ever known or heard of."' John-
son v. Clements, 25 Kan. 376 syL 4 (1881).
17. 6 Am. JuP. TRALS § 8, at 615 (1967).
18. Id. at 615-16.
19. C. GAMLz, McELRoy's ALAnms EvwmNcz 800 (3d ed. 1977).
19821 343
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interpreted as follows:
The trial court's sustention of a general objection will be affirmed
on appeal if there was any valid gound, even though unspecified,
upon which the offered evidence could have been excluded. Ab-
sent a request from the offering party that the grounds for the
objection be stated, it will be assumed that the objection was sus-
tained upon a correct ground.10
The words, "I object on the ground that the answer would vio-
late the Dead man's statute because the declarant is dead, the de-
clarant's legal representative is a party plaintiff, and the declarant
cannot be cross-examined," is an example of a specific objection. It
specifies with precise technicality ' the basis of the objection.
Many writers have addressed the object of, or reason for re-
quiring a statement of specific grounds for an objection. Collec-
tively, the need for specificity boils down to three purposes:
(1) To advise the court of the nature of the objection, and
(2) If the objection goes to form rather than substance, to afford
opposing counsel an opportunity to rephrase the question, or ask
preliminary or supplemental questions which will render the sub-
ject matter objected to competent (, and]"
(3) To give the trial judge "opportunity to rule correctly.""3
Although the basis for requiring a statement of the grounds for an
objection first appears to be a pedantic technicality, in fact, it
avoids technicalities and thereby promotes the effective adminis-
tration of justice. When the examiner is put on notice that his
question is leading, he may rephrase it. When he is told that the
foundation for his question is insufficient, he may strenghten it.
When he is told that his question is irrelevant, he may withdraw it.
The record on appeal would then be free from objectionable ques-
tions which could cause the case to be reversed on a technicality."
The general rule on the specific objection is that "if it is sus-
tained, the trial court's ruling must be sustained upon that specific
ground unless the evidence excluded was in no aspect of the case
competent, or could not be made so. If a specific objection is over-
ruled, only the grounds specified can be considered on appeal, un-
20. Id. at 803.
21. J. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE §§ 538, 630 (10th ed. 1973).
22. F. BUSCH, supra note 4, § 603, at 293-294.
23. Id. at 295.
24. See Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99, 124, 25 P. 816, 822 (1874); see also J.
PRINCE, supra note 21, at 531.
344 [Vol. 4:339
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less there is no purpose for which the evidence was admissible. ' 'Ss
In the regular course of the trial, to make and preserve the record
proper,
[wihen counsel feels that the court has erred, he should state in
his objection the precise nature of the error so that it may be
corrected immediately. Otherwise, the court may fall into irre-
versible error. Similarly, he should state the nature of any error
made by his opponent so that it may be corrected forthwith. The
proponent of an objection always has the burden of stating what
rule or rules of evidence he contends have been violated. If he
does not state such grounds, the objection is insufficient."
North Carolina's position is well stated in State v. Cornell;
"[W]hen an objection to evidence is made on a specific ground, the
competence of the evidence will be determined on appeal solely on
the basis of the grounds specified."' 7
Because the ground for ruling on an objection is not always
apparent to either judge or opposing counsel, the judge needs help
and guidance from the objecting parties. This need can be met by
requiring all objections to be specific. This requirement takes away
the element of surprise, ultimately allows the jury to hear more
facts from the witness, and reduces inadvertent errors in the ruling
of the trial judge because he then has knowledge of the very
ground upon which the objecting party relied. Thus, the number of
mistrials and new trials would be reduced as errors in the reception
or rejection of evidence are eliminated, and the losing party at trial
might not appeal if, on a later study of the transcript, he was con-
vinced the trial judge correctly applied the appropriate rules.
While some attorneys feel that North Carolina procedure does
not specifically allow the judge to require objecting counsel to spe-
cifically state his grounds, the better practice is to make such a
request, especially when the reason for objecting is not obvious.
"The court has a right to request counsel to state the grounds for
his objection if he has failed to do so. The adverse party has a
similar right, and may wish to exercise it, since the defect may be
25. J. PRiNCz, supra note 21, at 531.
26. 6 AM. Jur. TRiALs § 14, at 620-21 (1967). In Doby v. Fowler, 49 N.C. App.
162, 164-65, 270 S.E. 2d 532, 533-34 (1980), the court said: "We know of no au-
thority requiring counsel to argue case law to the trial court at the risk of other-
wise losing the benefit of an objection. Rule 46(b), if applicable , would only re-
quire a statement of the grounds for an objection, not the case law in support
thereof."
27. 281 N.C. 20, 21, 187 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1972).
1982] 345
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one that is able to cure, such as insufficient foundation or improper
form of question." 8
C. North Carolina Evidentiary Policies and Rules
Although it appears that no clear-cut, all-inclusive trial prac-
tice policy regarding objections exists in North Carolina, certain
limited principles have emerged in legislation. Rule 46(a)(2) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "If there is proper objection to
the admission of evidence and the objection is overruled, the ruling
of the court shall be deemed excepted to by the party making the
objection. If an objection to the admission of evidence is sustained
or if the court for any reason excludes evidence offered by a party,
the ruling of the court shall be deemed excepted to by the party
offering the evidence."' 9 Section (b) of Rule 46 applies the same
principles to the admission of evidence from a disqualified or in-
competent witness, to a specified line of questioning, and to rulings
and orders not directed to the admissibility of evidence. To pre-
serve an exception to rulings and orders not directed to the admis-
sibility of evidence, Section (b) provides that the party making the
objection must timely "make known to the court his objection to
the action of the court or make known the action which he desires
the court to take and his ground therefor. ...
The procedural rule in criminal cases most analogous to Rule
46 is North Carolina General Statute 15A-1446.8' (N.C. General
Statutes are hereinafter cited as G.S.) G.S. 15A-1446(a) provides
that the error cited on appeal must have "been brought to the at-
tention of the trial court by appropriate and timely objection or
motion."3'
No particular form is required... to preserve the right to assert
the alleged error upon appeal if the motion or objection clearly
presented the alleged error to the trial court. Formal exceptions
are not required, but when evidence is excluded a record must be
made in the manner provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 43 (c), in order
28. 6 Am. JuR. TRiALs § 14, at 621 (1967).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 46(a)(2) (1967).
30. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 46(b).
31. Id. § 15A-1446 (1977). (Although this statute is located in Article 91, cap-
tioned "Appeal to Appellate Division," it offers guidance regarding exceptions and
objections on appeal.)
32. Id.
[Vol. 4:339
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to assert upon appeal error in the exclusion of that evidence."
Although waiver is substantially the same in criminal as in civil
law, G.S. 15A-1446(b) adds, ".... but the appellate court may re-
view such errors in the interest of justice if it determines it appro-
priate to do so.""'
G.S. 15A-1446(d) lists situations in which the appellate divi-
sion may review assigned error even though "no objection, excep-
tion or motion has been made in the trial division." 5 Among the
nineteen statutory examples are lack of jurisdiction and insuffi-
ciency of the evidence as a matter of law."
The official commentary to G.S. 15A-1446 declares that a
statement of "charges" against the judge alleging error is no longer
prerequisite to preserving the right to appeal, but rather is an ad-
ditional step towards the elimination of error by bringing the mat-
ter of an objection "to the attention of the trial judge sufficiently
to permit him to correct the error.' 7 The commentary also reflects
that G.S. 15A-1446(a) "provides essentially that any timely objec-
tion or motion is sufficient and no particular formality is required
to preserve the right to assert an alleged error upon appeal if that
has been done.""
It would greatly assist the trial bench and bar if the appellate
division in North Carolina would indicate the order of argument
on an objection and whether counsel can be compelled to state spe-
cific grounds for his objection.9 As an alternative to Federal Rule
of Evidence No. 103, I would suggest the adoption to the following
provision into our General Rules of Practice: Whenever a general
objection is made to an offer of evidence, or whenever a general
objection is made, and a hearing before ruling is required, on re-
quest of the Presiding Judge, the offering counsel shall state for
what purpose the evidence or witness is offered; then the objecting
33. Defendant's expression of "unwillingness to consent" to the taking of ex-
hibits to jury room was held to be a "sufficient" expression of objection. Doby v.
Fowler, 49 N.C. App. 162, 164, 270 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1980).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446(b) (1977).
35. Id. § 15A-1446(d).
36. Id.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446 app., at 401 (1977).
38. Id. at 402.
39. Former Rule 4 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and Dis-
trict Courts addressed specific grounds for objections. It was replaced by N.C.
GEN. STAT. App. I, Super. and District Ct. R. 11, at 272 (1970), however, and Rule
11 no longer addresses objections.
OBJECTIONS 3471982]
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counsel shall state the specific grounds for his objection, and be
heard in support thereof, and the proponent may be heard once in
rebuttal. The arguments shall proceed no further unless by leave of
the court.
The practice to be encouraged is that counsel be prepared to
buttress an objection by giving the grounds therefor, which, in
both foresight and hindsight, are sufficiently definite to enable
both the presiding and appellate judge to make a correct determi-
nation as to whether the evidence is properly admitted or
excluded.
Not all objections require a hearing. An impropriety may be
obvious in many questions and answers. Failure to state specific
grounds would then be of no consequence. Should the evidence not
be admissible for any purpose, again, lack of specificity would be of
no consequence, and the general objection would suffice.
Congress has codified the Rules of Evidence for the federal
system, and has made them applicable to all criminal and civil tri-
als." Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence controls the sub-
ject matter of rulings on evidence. Rule 103 embraces the objec-
tion, offer of proof, record of offer, and ruling by the court. The
central policy of Rule 103 is that a ruling on an objection is not
error unless it affects a substantial right of the party. Federal pro-
cedure requires a specific objection to the admission of evidence,
and requires a statement of the grounds of objection. A general
objection is not a sufficient basis upon which to predicate error un-
less it concerns a constitutional matter, or unless the record dis-
closes a plain error which affects a substantial right."1
Although North Carolina has not adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence, a Legislative Research Commission submitted a report
on the "Law of Evidence and Comparative Negligence' 42 to the
1981 General Assembly. After extensive analysis, the Commission
reported that the Federal Rules of Evidence, for the most part,
"were consistent with North Carolina practice."' s The Study Com-
mittee recommended no immediate changes in the North Carolina
system, but encouraged the Legislature to "direct its efforts toward
40. FED. R. Evw. 101.
41. FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
42. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF 1981, Law of Evidence and Comparative Negligence (14 Jan. 1981) (Copies on
file in the Legislative Library, Room 2126, 2266, N.C. State Legislative Building,
Raleigh, N.C.).
43. Id. at 3.
[Vol. 4:339348
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the proposed evidence code."'4' Indeed, the enactment of Federal
Rule 103 alone in North Carolina would improve the administra-
tion of justice in our trial courts.
D. "Blanket" Objections
A troublesome matter in North Carolina practice is knowing
what to do when an objection occurs to a specified line of question-
ing. " This problem arose due to uncertainty in the application of
Rule 46(a)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in criminal trials. 4"
Before the adoption of Rule 46, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals ruled that line or "blanket" objections were improper in
criminal cases and required a separate objection to each question
on the same subject matter.7 Rule 46(a)(1) became effective on
January 1, 1970; in unmuddied words the rule provides that "when
there is an objection to the admission of evidence involving speci-
fied line of questioning, it shall be deemed that a like objection has
been taken to any subsequent admission of evidence involving the
same line of questioning."4 Dean Brandis has pointed out that al-
though Rule 46(a)(1) applied to civil trials only, there was no rea-
son why the rule should not apply to criminal trials as well.'9 Nev-
ertheless, some uncertainty persisted.
In 1977, the North Carolina Legislature concurred with the
opinion of Dean Brandis with regard to the application of line ob-
jections to criminal trials. The result was the enactment of G.S.
15A-1446(d)(10). ° The substance of subsection (d)(10) may be
summarized as follows: Once counsel makes an objection in a crim-
44. Id. at 4.
45. It was held to be both prejudicial and reversible error when the trial
judge told the court reporter to "put an 'overruled' after every time he [defense
counsel) says objection." Thirty-eight new objections followed and no additional
rulings were made by the judge. A judge has an affirmative duty to rule on all
objections. State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 10-12, 181 S.E. 2d 561, 567-68 (1971).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 46(a)(1) (1967).
47. State v. Sherron, 4 N.C. App. 386, 389, 166 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1969).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 46(a)(1) (1967). "When upon a trial an ob-
jection has once been distinctly made and overruled, it need not be repeated to
the same class evidence." G. BRADNE, RuLS oF EVIDENCE AS PRACICED BY THE
COMMON LAW FOR THE TRIAL OF AcTIONS AND PROCEEDING 499 (1895). Thus, North
Carolina's civil rule follows the common law.
49. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 9, § 29, at 78.
50. N.C. GE. STAT. § 15A-1446(d)(10) (1977). (Note that this statement is
obscurely situated in Article 91, "Appeal to Appellate Division," and not among
the "Rules of Evidence.")
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inal trial to a specified line of questions, which is improperly over-
ruled, it need not be repeated to preserve the error for appellate
review." Thus, under current rules of practice, only a proper first
objection is required to preserve an objection to a line of questions.
What was so recently improper is now proper.
Although the underlying reason for rules about "blanket" ob-
jections is to eliminate needless and time-consuming repetition of
objections to the same line of testimony from the same witness, the
reason is more easily stated than applied. Despite the propriety of
line objections, the right to object may be waived by the failure to
make a timely objection, and an attorney may have his supposed
blanket objection uncovered by waiver. Furthermore, it may be dif-
ficult for counsel to know when opposing counsel is through with a
specified line of questioning. Frequently, after several questions
into the line, additional questions may become objectionable for
quite different legal grounds, such as leading questions, or ques-
tions which call for an improper opinion. Yet, if no new objection
is made, incompetent evidence may be substantively introduced
while the initially objecting counsel is relaxing under his "blan-
ket." "Time saved" could become the very basis for an unwanted
affirmance on appeal.
Many questions about line objections remain for Appellate Di-
vision interpretation. Dean Brandis has considered some of the
problems and made the following observations:
1. A line objection made after the same evidence has been ad-
mitted from the same or another witness has the same status, for
purposes of the waiver rule, as an objection to a single question.
2. Counsel may not wish to interpose a "line" objection to the
first of what he anticipates will be a series of related questions,
because making the "line" objection at this point seems to as-
sume an unfavorable ruling. An objection confined to the first
question, followed, if that is overruled, by a "line" objection to
the second question (or a request that the initial objection be
broadened to a "line" objection) would seem sufficient to secure
the benefit of the Rule.
3. The objection must be to a "specified line of questioning."
Therefore, it must indicate, for example, that the "line" involves
testimony irrelevant for stated reasons, or calls for inadmissible
hearsay or opinion. If irrelevance is the ground, and subsequent
questions on the same basic subject matter call for hearsay, a spe-
cific objection to the latter would be required.
51. 1 D. STANsBURY, supra note 9, § 30, at 82.
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4. Obviously, where there is a possible difference of opinion as
to whether a particular question is within the "line," cautious
counsel will interpose a further objection.
5. As worded, the Rule seems to make the "line" objection cover
not only questions asked of the witness then testifying, but also
questions asked of subsequent witnesses.
6. With reference to subsequent evidence elicited on cross-ex-
amination or otherwise introduced by the objector, the "line" ob-
jection would seem to have the same status as an objection to a
single question-that is, there might or might not be a waiver,
dependent upon the circumstances.
Finally, it should be noted that, whether the objection is to a
single question or to a "line," the judge is not required to overrule
it simply because it comes after the same evidence has been re-
ceived without objection. 2
When an objection has been made and overruled, trial counsel
are frequently unsure whether to cross-examine the witness on the
identical subject matter covered by the objection. This uncertainty
has frequently caused time-consuming argument during trial, The
still valid answer to this uncertainty can be found in a 1927 deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina."3 The trial court had
admitted incompetent evidence of change in conditions of an em-
barkment at a railroad crossing over the objection of the defense
counsel. Defense counsel then conducted a cross-examination con-
cerning the same subject matter. The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the established rule "that if incompetent evidence is admitted over
objection, but the same evidence has theretofore been given in
other parts of the examination without objection, the benefit of the
exception is ordinarily lost. . . ."" The court went on to say:
But when a trial judge admits evidence over objection, it there-
upon becomes proper evidence to be considered by the jury so far
as the particular trial in the Superior Court is concerned, and the
rule does not mean that the adverse party may not, on cross-ex-
amination, explain the evidence or destroy its probative value, or
even contradict it with other evidence, upon peril of losing the
benefit of his exception. 55
52. Id.
53. Shelton v. Southern Railway Co., 193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232 (1927).
54. Id. at 674, 139 S.E. at 235.
55. Id. at 674-75, 139 S.E. at 235.
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III. To OBJECT OR NOT To OBJECT?
A. Excessive Objections?
A vigorously contested case usually results in a prolific number
of objections which aggravate the practical problems of maintain-
ing order and ruling correctly at trial. This proposition is exempli-
fied by the proceedings in State v. Barfield." The death penalty
was imposed after the defendant was convicted of murder. After
losing on her motion for appropriate relief, the defendant included
the following statement in her petition for certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina:
Upon analysis of the transcript of the hearing before Judge Bras-
well, defense counsel has determined that seven hundred ninety-
four objections were interposed during this four and one-half day
hearing by the District Attorney. More than half of those objec-
tions, four hundred two to be exact, were overruled by Judge
Braswell. In contrast, defense counsel objected to the cross-exam-
ination questions by the District Attorney a total of only thirty-
nine times. While such numbers are not at all conclusive, they are
indicative of the bad faith disruptive character of many of the
objections lodged by the District Attorney. Moreover, they are
strongly indicative of the problems confronting Judge Braswell in
simply managing the hearing before him. Because of such a mael-
strom, Judge Braswell may justifiably have been confused about
that testimony which was in the record for his consideration and
that testimony which was in the record proper only.57
In meeting this argument, Donald W. Stephens, Assistant At-
torney General of North Carolina, articulated the converse view in
the "State's Response":
Finally, the petitioner alleges she was denied a full and fair hear-
ing before Judge Braswell. Petitioner notes 794 objections to evi-
dence made by attorney for the State. Petitioner seems to over-
look the basic premise that the people of the State of North
Carolina are also entitled to expect adequate and effective repre-
sentation by their attorneys. This is not a onesided affair with
56. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct.
3050, 65 L.Ed.2d 1137, reh'g denied, - U.S. ._-, 101 S.Ct. 41, 65 L.Ed.2d 1181
(1980); No. 69 N.C. Sup. Ct., cert. denied (July 9, 1981); U.S. Sup. Ct., cert. de-
nied (Oct. 19, 1981), reh'g denied (Dec. 7, 1981). (78 CR 4928, Robeson Co. Super.
Ct.; 78 CR 8262, Bladen Co. Super. Ct.; 81 CR 6967 Columbus Co. Super. Ct.).
57. Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 93, State v. Barfield, No.
69, N.C. Sup. Ct. (Spring Term, 1981).
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different rules applying to the parties. At this proceeding both
the State and the petitioner were governed by the basic rules of
evidence and procedure. Petitioner was not at liberty to ignore
those rules, nor were the attorneys for the State required to sit
silently by as petitioner attempted to interject incompetent or ir-
relevant evidence into the proceedings. Likewise, it is reasonable
and appropriate for the State's attorneys to object to improperly
phrased hypothetical questions or evidence presented in an im-
proper manner. Every lawyer is expected to know and follow the
fundamentals in presenting evidence and in trying a lawsuit ....
In this adversary proceeding, just as the petitioner's attorneys
had the duty to require that the State follow and abide by the
rules of evidence and procedure, so too did the attorneys for the
State have the duty to require their adversaries to do the same.
This does not constitute a denial of a full and fair hearing; this
constitutes a requirement that the hearing take place consistent
with the requirements of law. That is precisely what occurred."
After consideration, but without a formal opinion, the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina denied relief and upheld the judg-
ment of the trial court.8" On October 19, 1981, the Supreme Court
of the United States rejected Mrs. Barfield's review, and denied
certiorari."0 Therefore, it appears that frequent objections made in
good faith do not prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial;
rather, objections made in good faith are a requirement of a fair
trial.
B. Common Causes
Experience has shown that situations frequently occur that
seem to guarantee counsel will voice an objection. To the court-
room observer these situations generally fall into the following nine
war-cry categories:
1. leading questions,
2. "testifying" questions,
3. "loaded" questions,
4. improper cross-examination,
58. State's Response at 39-41, State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510
(1979), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 3050, 65 L.Ed.2d 1137, reh'g denied,
U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 41, 65 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1980).
59. Orders of North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Barfield, 78 CR 4928
(Robeson Co. Super. Ct., filed July 9, 1981).
60. Barfield v. North Carolina, 50 U.S.L.W. 3301, 81-5372 (U.S. Oct. 20,
1981).
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5. declarative statements,
6. argumentative phraseology,
7. endless repetition,
8. habitual expressions, and
9. unidentified exhibits.
1. Leading Questions
Leading questions, 1 in a limited number, are often necessary
to "open up" a witness. Leading questions are proper for prelimi-
nary matters." But if a prosecutor asks the victim, "Did the defen-
dant say 'give me all the money. in the cash register'?" or if a de-
fense counsel asks his client, "Did you act in self-defense?," such
questions lead the witness into the heart of the controversy, and go
beyond the realm of preliminary questions.
Much of the difficulty encountered in the phrasing of the ques-
tion will be avoided if the trial lawyer constantly bears in mind
the limitations on the subject matter of testimony... If the ex-
aminer stays within the limits of the formula of "what, when, and
where," he will rarely get into trouble over the form... ."
The late Chief Judge of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Ray-
mond B. Mallard, when yet on the trial bench, taught me to add to
this formula "who, how, why, explain, or describe" as the first word
of the question when doing any direct examination. A concerted
practice of using this formula will result in counsel being surprised
at how much more smoothly his case flows, how he still has control,
and how much better the jury is grasping his evidence. A consid-
ered use of the formula will overcome bad habits with leading
questions."
The form of the question generally is a product of the de-
meanor and style of the examiner. The only real cure for improper
form is thorough preparation. The lawyer must evaluate the dis-
putable facts and propositions during his pretrial investigation,
and then prepare for objections by deciding:
a. what available evidence is relevant on each proposition;
61. See Ogle, Parkman and Porter, Questions: Leading and Otherwise, 19
JUDGES' J. 42-45 (1980).
62. State v. Johnson, 272 N.C. 239, 158 S.E.2d 95 (1967); State v. Thompson,
22 N.C. App. 178, 205 S.E.2d 772 (1974).
63. H. BODIN, PRESENTING THE EVIDENCE 13 (1954).
64. See 6 AM. JUR. TsRws § 17, at 623; I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TCHNIQUES, 364
(1969); Ogle, supra note 61.
[Vol. 4:339
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/3
b. what available witnesses, if any, are subject to objection for
incompetence;
c. what available witnesses, if any, are privileged and to what
extent;
d. what available testimony, if any, is subject to a claim of privi-
lege and by whom;
e. what available evidence is hearsay and upon what proposi-
tion; and if hearsay, whether it can be brought within an
exception;
f. what available evidence involves questions of opinion, lay or
expert, and how objections thereto can be met; [and]
g. what use of secondary evidence of writings he must make and
what he must do to explain failure to produce the originals.0s
With the education gained from preparation, the lawyer will find
that the trial judge will make favorable rulings upon his knowl-
edgeable objections and opposing counsel will interpose fewer ob-
jections based upon the form of the question.
2. "Testifying Questions"
A lawyer himself may attempt to testify through his examina-
tion even though he phrases his words in the form of a question.
The lawyer's personal credibility is then drawn into issue, and such
questioning is improper. If an attorney wants to testify, he should
withdraw as counsel. When the lawyer is not sworn as a witness,
the adversary has no means by which to cross-examine the insinua-
tion of the improper question. Examples of phrases that show a
lawyer to be "testifying" are:
a. "Do I remember you correctly when you said that...?"
b. "My notes say differently, and don't you agree that my notes
of what you said are better than your recollection?"
c. "We spoke in the hallway by the water cooler, and I know
that you told me you left the scene before the shooting, didn't
you?"
d. "This was a part of the plan, as I understand the system of
distribution, wasn't it?"
e. "That's what I wanted you to answer, thank you!"
3. Loaded Questions
When a lawyer "loads" his questions with facts not in evi-
dence, he may be trying to pull a fast one on the opposition, the
65. 1 E. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMs OF EVIDENCE, at v (1961).
OBJCTIONS19821 355
17
Braswell: Objections - Howls of a Dog-Pound Quarrel
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
court, or the jury. The loaded question seeks to circumvent the
regular rules for admissibility of evidence. Examples are:
a. "Have you stopped drinking liquor?" Counsel asked this
question even though the record did not show that the witness
had ever consumed alcohol.
b. "Aren't you aware that the co-defendant who just testified is
a chronic liar?" Because no evidence existed that the co-defen-
dant was a liar, much less a chronic liar, the objection was sus-
tained immediately.
Sometimes a lawyer will intentionally ask a long series of
loaded and objectionable questions. Each objection will be sus-
tained; but, by the improper questions alone, the wrong idea of
"truth" has been planted in the minds of the jurors, and fairness
seems to work against the attorney making the proper objections.
Should this practice become gross or abusive, a trip to the ethical
woodshed of the judge's chambers or State Bar could become the
appropriate curative action.
4. Improper Cross-Examination
Many counsel deem themselves ready-made experts in the art
of cross-examination. If the door has not been opened to a given
subject, counsel should not enter the arena. For example: "Did the
defendant tell you that he had to shoot in self-defense when de-
ceased was coming on him with a hawk-bill knife, shouting, 'Your
grave is before you!'?" Because the question was asked by defense
counsel on cross-examination of the sheriff at the time when the
state had not opened the door as to any statements by the defen-
dant, and the defendant had not testified, the questioner was seek-
ing an unfair advantage in objectionable violation of the rules of
cross-examination.
5. Declarative Statements
When examining a witness, the function of the attorney is to
ask questions. Examination is not the time for declarations or
speeches by the examiner. Among objectionable statements to be
avoided are these:
a. "Now, according to my notes you said that .... " This
utterance causes the opponent to jump up and say, "Object!
That's not what my notes say he said!" Neither the jury, witness,
nor opposing counsel should become involved in a debate over the
accuracy of the lawyer's notes, nor debate the lawyer's ability to
[Vol. 4:339
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take and read shorthand. It is the duty of the jury to remember
what any witness said, and how one answer may differ from
another.
b. "Now, I believe your testimony was that. . .".. The op-
portunity is given counsel to develop evidence by questions. The
issue is not whether counsel remembers evidence correctly, nor
whether counsel can honestly restate what he believes he heard.
The credibility of counsel should never be injected into the issues
at trial.
c. "Well, strike that, you have already testified that you saw
the flash of the revolver!"
d. "Let's start where they left off with that question."
e. "I gather then that you have an opinion that the plaintiff
will be partially permanently paralyzed."
f. "That's all I wanted to know, thank you."
6. Argumentative Phraseology
When a witness makes a response to a question that counsel
cannot force himself to accept or believe, a series of argumentative
questions usually follows. Examples of a lapse into objectionable
practice are:
a. "Now, isn't it a fact that you really don't believe yourself
what you have just asked this jury to believe. The accident just
couldn't possibly have happened the way you tell it, could it?"
b. "Now, do you really expect us to believe that story?"
7. Endless Repetition
Questions and answers previously elicited and made by the
same party cannot be repeated. The reasons are twofold: first,
having the same questions and answers repeated wastes time; sec-
ond, it places undue emphasis on those questions which have been
previously asked and answered. This rule applies equally to direct
and cross examinations. The cross-examiner, however, may ask
questions which have been previously posed during the direct."
Problems arise most frequently when a lawyer attempts to re-
peat the substance of a previous question to which he has received
a favorable response. The attorney will endeavor to phrase the
question in a slightly different manner in order to emphasize the
response. 67
66. T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRAL PRAcTiCE 381 (1980).
67. Id. at 382.
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To be objectionable, the new question need not be identical; if
the question reasonably calls for the same answer, the opponent's
objection should be sustained. Although the Federal Rules have no
specific provision against repetitive questions and answers, Federal
Rule of Evidence 611(a) gives the Court discretion in controlling
examinations of witnesses "to avoid needless consumption of
time. ' 68
8. Habitual Expletives
Habitual expressions, while they may help the speaker think
on his feet, needlessly clog up the machinery by provoking objec-
tions. Examples are: "that's right," "good," "true," "O.K.," "I see,"
"correct, now let me ask you this . . .," "just so we are playing
from the same sheet of music. . . ," and "I don't want to ask you
an objectionable question, but. .. ." Counsel should train himself
to avoid these uncalled for personal intrusions into the case.
9. Unidentified Exhibits
Conflicts in questioning arise also when physical evidence is
used without identifying the exhibit, or without offering the object
into evidence. This attempt at presentation once occurred: "With-
out introducing this check in evidence, I hand it to you and ask
you if this is not your own check?" Although the objection was
sustained, back came the lament of counsel: "But your honor, we
are not seeking to introduce evidence, we just want him to see this
check." Without identification "this check" cannot be understood
in the record proper, and the offer is useless. When counsel en-
gages in this maneuver, a refresher course in evidence becomes a
necessity.
C. Trial Tactics
From the vantage point of judges and jurors, it often appears
that a lawyer, by his method in questioning, is attempting to run
roughshod over everyone, in an effort to see what he can get away
with. This lawyer will be thinking, "If the other side does not ob-
ject, I have won my point, and am home free." Such an individual,
whenever he makes his appearance, has forgotten his ethics and
morals. The North Carolina General Rules of Practice for Superior
and District Courts clearly state that counsel shall not "offer evi-
68. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
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dence which he knows to be inadmissible."6 In commenting on
this rule, Dean Brandis observed: "If counsel knows that evidence
is inadmissible he should not offer it at all, and if admissible for
one purpose but not for another, he should offer it only for the
former. ' 70 "This practice should be dictated by a sense of fairness
and adherence to ethical standards ... "7l
In giving practical advise on "The Tactics of Objections," Mc-
Cormick stated: "... no objections should be made unless you
have reason to believe that the making of the objection will do
your case more good than harm. 7 2 "[Y]our objections should be
few and should be directed only to evidence which if admitted will
be substantially harmful, and to which you think you can get a
favorable ruling at the trial or on appeal. -7 3
D. Objections From the Bench
Judges have been heard on occasion to say, "Objection sus-
tained," when there has been no objection voiced by either counsel.
This happened on ten occasions in State v. Gore and Gause.7 4 On
appeal, counsel for Gause contended the trial court committed re-
versible error by sustaining its own objections. 75 The Court of Ap-
peals disagreed, and gave the applicable rule of law:
While in some cases the trial court may commit prejudicial error
by sustaining its own objection ... it may, of its own motion and
in the exercise of its right to regulate the conduct of the trial,
exclude or strike evidence which is wholly incompetent or inad-
missible for any purpose, even in the absence of an objection."
Applying that law to the Gause contention, the Court of Ap-
peals wrote:
In the present case, we cannot find that the trial judge, in sus-
taining his own objections, exceeded the bounds of impartiality
and cold neutrality. From our review of relevant portions of the
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. App. I, Super. and Dist. Ct. R.12, at 273 (1970).
70. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 9, § 26, at 62.
71. Id. at 62 n.97.
72. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 52, at 119.
73. Id.
74. State v. Gause, No. 815 SC 107 (N.C. App. June 16, 1981); State v. Gore,
No. 8013 SC 1164 (N.C. App. June 16, 1981). Petitions for discretionary review
were denied August 17, 1981, 303 N.C. 548 (1981).
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id.
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record, it appears that the judge sustained his own objection to at
least five of the questions because they were leading to hearsay;
one of the ten questions was argumentative; three of them were
questions asked about an exhibit after the State objected on the
grounds that the State had not seen the exhibit; defendant
Gause's attorney persisted over the sustaining of the objection
even though the witness had disclaimed knowledge about the de-
tails of the exhibit; and finally, at least one question, relating to
when pictures of defendant had been taken, was irrelevant. We
cannot say that the trial court's actions in sustaining its own ob-
jections amounted to an expression of opinion which would neces-
sitate a new trial."
IV. GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION AND OFFER OF PROOF
There is no "burden of proof" on the subject of objections as
the phrase is ordinarily used. The judge has an independent re-
sponsibility to rule correctly. By objecting, ".... the opponent
merely invokes the law; if it is applicable to the evidence, the pro-
ponent must make the evidence satisfy the law."78 The party who
makes the objection has an affirmative duty, concisely and without
argument, to tell the court and the offering counsel the "rule or
rules of evidence he contends has been violated."7' "Counsel
should not begin to argue the merits of the objection until the
court invites him to do so, and he should wait until his opponent is
seated before standing to address the court."' As reiterated in Mc-
Elroy's Alabama Evidence, "[sluch is not a time for making an
oration or even a modest speech, unless the trial court indicates a
desire or willingness to hear extended arguments on the ques-
tion. 81 "[T]here is, of course, no impropriety in a party's arguing
his objections to the trial court, but the trial court is not bound to
permit argument of an objection to, or a motion to exclude,
evidence." 82
Occasions have occurred wherein the objecting party re-
sponded to his opponent's request to state the grounds for objec-
tion by saying: "I don't have to do that! I have made a valid objec-
tion, and it's up to him (opponent) to clean up his own act. I also
77. Id. at 3-4.
78. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 347.
79. 6 AM. JuR. TRiALS § 14, at 621 (1967).
80. Id. § 11, at 618; see also Annot., 31 A.L.R. 1185 (1924).
81. C. GAMBLE, supra note 19, at 804.
82. Id.
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object to His Honor's 'quarterbacking' for the other side!" Such a
popular notion, though once the habit in the trial division, ought
not to continue as a custom. The general rule is: "The court has a
right to request counsel to state the grounds for his objection if he
failed to do so. The adverse party has a similar right, and may wish
to exercise it, since the defect may be one that he is able to cure,
such as insufficient foundation or improper form of question." 's8
Even if the ground for objection is validly given as improper foun-
dation, however, the objecting counsel has no duty to tell his oppo-
nent how to present the needed background testimony to the
court. Likewise, should counsel object on the ground of leading
question, there is no duty in the objector to educate his opponent
on how to phrase the question in a non-leading way. Every licensed
attorney is supposed to know how to offer evidence properly and
how to correctly phrase his questions.
Once an objection has been made, the proponent of the evi-
dence has a right to make an offer of proof to justify the propriety
of the question. "The offer of proof should be sufficient and accu-
rate, and great care should be taken to offer exactly the proof that
will be shown-no more and no less."'" The offer of proof should
be out of presence of the jury. Once the judge has ruled on the
objection, there is no right to make an offer for the record proper,
if there was request or opportunity to do so before the ruling. Once
the questioning has resumed, the losing party has no right to "go
back" and make his offer of proof on the record. Nor can he wait
until after the close of the evidence and then request to put it on
the record. The offer of proof comes too late if not made simulta-
neously with the ruling during any hearing on the objection.s
A touchy moment in a trial transpires when the judge denies
counsel the requested opportunity to make an offer of proof for the
83. 6 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 14, at 621 (1967).
84. Id. § 15, at 622.
85. In State v. Willis, 20 N.C. App. 43, 46, 200 S.E.2d 408, 410 (1973), the
N.C. Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's "denial of defendant's mo-
tion-made at the close of this case-to let the record show the answers that
would have been given to questions to which the objections were sustained." The
Court recognized that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 43(c) does not state that time
is of the essence in making such a motion. Nevertheless, the Court refused to
sustain the assignment of error under "the well-established right of the trial court
in its discretion to control the conduct of the parties, counsel and the witnesses."
See also State v. Blue, 270 N.C. 283, 285, 154 S.E.2d 99, 100-01 (1967); Electro
Lift, Inc. v. Miller Equipment Co., 270 N.C. 433, 436, 154 S.E.2d 465, 466-67
(1967).
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record after an objection has been sustained. Counsel is left mut-
tering to himself: "He can't do that!" While it is true that counsel
has a duty to offer the answer to the objected question on the re-
cord in order for the appellate division to determine relevancy,
competency, and error in general, upon counsel's failure to put the
answer in the record, the error of the ruling is ordinarily lost, and
there is no ironclad right to get all answers to objectionable ques-
tions in the record. If the motion calls for an answer that is not
competent upon any legal principle, the judge can deny the offer of
proof. This is dangerous practice for the judge, and he had better
know his rules of evidence. The following exchange in State v.
Taylors6 best illustrates the North Carolina position. The discus-
sion occurred during an evidentiary hearing on a defense motion
which alleged underrepresentation of blacks on the jury in a chal-
lenge to the method of selection.
Q. How can you explain the fact that although the population of
New Hanover County is made up of 23 percent black people, the
jury lists that you have come up with is constituted of only 17
percent black people?
MR. GRANNIS: Objection.
COURT: Sustained.
Exception.
MRS. TALLY: I would like to make an offer of proof.
COURT: The objection is sustained.
Defendant contends the court committed reversible error by
sustaining the State's objection and by not allowing defendant to
make an offer of proof. We do not agree.
The objection was properly sustained because any answer
this witness could have given would have been based on specula-
tion and conjecture. For the same reason, the trial judge acted
within his atuhority in not allowing defendant to include the tes-
timony in the record because it is clear that the testimony would
not have been admissible on any grounds. Such matters are prop-
erly left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the trial
judge.... Mr. Farrell had earlier stated that, in his opinion, thejury pool list reflected a fair cross-section of the community. It
should be clear then that any statement he might make as to the
alleged underrepresentation of blacks could only be based on con-
jecture. This assignment is overruled.87
86. 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981).
87. Id. at 261-62, 283 S.E.2d at 770. But see State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 136,
282 S.E.2d 449, 457-58 (1981), in which the refusal of the trial judge to allow
answers to be preserved for the record proper was reversible error.
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The problem of getting an offer of proof into the record can
arise during jury voir dire. In State v. Washington," four of de-
fense counsel's questions were read into the record proper out of
the presence of the jury. On the State's objection, no answers were
given by any prospective juror. The Supreme Court analyzed each
question and ruled, basically, that the trial court's failure to allow
any of the questions or answers was correct, and that "no prospec-
tive juror should have been required to answer" the improper
questions, even for the record proper.89 The impropriety could be
determined from the question alone.
V. RECENT NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Several of the aforementioned problems with objections have
recently arisen in the North Carolina Trial Division. The questions
presented have required that the Appellate Division delineate its
current views. The factual situations in the four cases reviewed be-
low should provide valuable instruction to members of both the
bar and bench with regard to the following propositions:
1. By subsequently presenting evidence of substantially iden-
tical subject matter, a prior objection will be waived.
2. The admission of objectionable testimony at trial will not
warrant reversal unless it is deemed prejudicial to the opponent.
3. Motions to strike must immediately follow the testimonial
response to which an objection is desired.
4. It is improper for counsel to elicit repetitive responses
from a witness, however, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to allow an answer to be repeated if the intent is to clear-up
prior confusing testimony.
5. Ordinarily, when incompetent or objectionable evidence is
withdrawn from the jury's consideration by the trial court's in-
structions, any error in the admission of the evidence is cured.
6. The objection to a witness' qualification as an expert re-
quires specificity. A "general objection" to expert qualifications is
insufficient to preserve an exception for appellate review.
In State v. King" the defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree. State's witness, Speer, testified "he heard deceased
tell defendant 'don't be talking about the Martins, I am a Mar-
88. 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E.2d 534 (1973).
89. Id. at 188, 195 S.E.2d at 543.
90. 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980).
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tin'." 1 Then the witness was asked: "What, if anything, did you
see in the way of or hear in the way of coming from him?""2 Over
objection, the witness answered: "I didn't hear Mr. King say any-
thing but I could sort of see his mouth moving like in a low mum-
ble, but you could not understand what he was saying. ' 9s
Given this background, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held that:
The answer was in no way prejudicial to defendant's interests. It
is incumbent upon the defendant not only to show error but also
to demonstate that the error so identified was prejudicial....
Furthermore, evidence of the same import was introduced at a
later point in the direct examination of the witness when
Mr. Speer was allowed to testify "Mr. King then said something
else in a low tone of voice. I could not understand him... ." By
failing to object to the latter testimony, defendant waived his ob-
jection to the challenged testimony."
In State v. Small," Earl Locklear testified as a State's witness
and described a meeting between himself, Paul Locklear, and de-
fendant. Mr. Locklear testified that "when he entered the store de-
fendant was lying on a mattress in a small storage room 'bragging
about the women he had made love to on the mattress.' "" This
dialogue then followed:
QUESTION: What did he say about that?
MR. E. BRIrrT: Object. Move to strike.
THE COURT: Overruled.
QUESTION (by Mr. J. Britt); Go ahead.
ANSWER: Well, he said he had made love to them "dog fashion,"
legs straight up in the air.
QUESTION: What else?
ANSWER: Blow jobs.
QUESTION: All right.
MR. E. BRrr. Object. Move to strike.
Tim COURT: All right. Let's be quiet. Overruled.
During further cross-examination Mr. Locklear testified: "We
91. Id. at 189, 270 S.E.2d at 100.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
96. Id. at 431, 272 S.E.2d at 143.
97. Id. at 431-32, 272 S.E.2d at 143.
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went into the back room and James was bragging about having sex
with other women, that is what he told me. . . ."98 "There was no
objection to the evidence tending to show that defendant had, gen-
erally, had sex with other women."" Although defendant conceded
that such testimony might be competent to show motive, he con-
tended that it was error to permit evidence which described in
some detail the nature of defendant's sexual encounters with the
other women.
On these facts the Supreme Court of North Carolina held:
In the testimony here complained of, only the reference to "blow
jobs" could conceivably amount to evidence tending to show that
defendant had committed a prior criminal act .... Nonetheless,
we believe that it was error to permit this testimony detailing the
manner in which the defendant engaged in sexual relations with
other women. We are satisfied, however, that given the admissi-
bility of the fact that defendant had sexual relations with other
women, the outcome of the trial would not have been different
had this bit of embellishment not been admitted. There is no
"reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been
committed, a different result would have been reached at the
trial...." G.S. 15A-1443. The embellishment does not necessar-
ily, in today's society at least, make defendant out to be a "moral
degenerate" as the court described the effect of the testimony in
Rinaldi dealing with homosexual advances. This assignment of
error is, therefore, overruled. 1°°
Problems with polygraph tests cropped up in State v. Small as
well.101 During cross-examination the District Attorney sought to
question the defendant about a second polygraph examination af-
ter the defendant had voluntarily testified that he had taken two
polygraph tests. "Q. And that is the one that you say showed de-
ception on the test in; is that correct?" The defense objection was
overruled. Immediately prior to this the District Attorney had
asked the question, "You have not seen a copy of the report given
to your lawyer?"102 His answer was, "I was told I didn't do too well
on it."1 9 The Supreme Court ruled:
98. Id. at 432, 272 S.E.2d at 143.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 433, 272 S.E.2d at 144.
101. Id. at 434-35. 272 S.E.2d at 144-45.
102. Id. at 434, 272 S.E.2d at 145.
103. Id. at 435, 272 S.E.2d at 145.
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First we note that the defendant neither objected to the question,
"You have not seen a copy of the report given to your lawyers?"
nor did he move to strike his answer, "I was told I didn't do too
well on it." Consequently, defendant has not properly preserved
his Exception No. 33. "In case of a specific question, objection
should be made as soon as the question is asked and before the
witness has time to answer. Sometimes, however, inadmissibility
is not indicated by the question, but becomes apparent by some
feature of the answer. In such a case the objection should be
made as soon as its inadmissibility becomes known, and should be
in the form of a motion to strike out the answer or the objectiona-
ble part of it." [citation omitted]. . . . Second, defendant's later
objection to the question, "And that is the one that you say you
showed deception on the test in; is that correct?", was not on the
ground that the question asked for polygraph results, but on the
ground that the witness was being asked to repeat former testi-
mony. If the objection was properly overruled on this ground, an-
other ground cannot be assigned to it on appeal. . . .Mere repe-
tition should not generally be permitted . . . ; but there are
circumstances . . . where repetition is appropriate. . . .Here the
question was obviously asked to clear up any confusion that
might have existed as to which polygraph test the witness was
referring. It was well within the trial court's discretion to permit
the answer for this purpose. Defendant's objection on the ground
assigned, therefore, was properly overruled.'0 4
The role of curative instructions is illustrated by State v.
Pruitt.10 5 Defendant was on trial for conspiracy to commit forgery
and conspiracy to utter forged instruments. On recross-examina-
tion, the prosecuting attorney asked a defense witness, "Who got
killed?" The defendant objected to the answer, "Jerry Kenan."
The court overruled the objection and a motion for mistrial.
Defendant Pruitt contended it was error to allow the State to
question a witness with respect to another offense unrelated to the
case being tried. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina said:
When the jury returned to the courtroom after the conference [at
the bench] had been concluded between the attorneys and judge,
the court immediately proceeded to give the following instruction:
"Members of the jury, during the course of the trial there has
been some testimony in reference to an individual by the name of
104. Id. at 435-36, 272 S.E.2d at 145 (emphasis added).
105. 301 N.C. 683, 273 S.E.2d 264 (1980).
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Jerry Kenan and that Jerry Kenan was recently murdered. The
Court instructs you that the circumstances and the death of Jerry
Kenan have nothing entirely to do with this particular case and
that there is no evidence that this defendant was whatsoever in
any way involved in that, or had anything to do with it, and
you're not to hold anything concerning Jerry Kenan and his de-
mise against this particular defendant. He's not to be prejudiced
by that. We're trying a forgery and a conspiracy to forge case. Is
there anyone on this jury who thinks they cannot strike this ref-
erence from their mind and who will not, or who cannot refrain
from holding against this particular defendant in these cases? If
there is anyone, please raise your hand." 1 [No hands were
raised.]
In discussing its ruling on these instructions, the Court held:
Ordinarily, when incompetent or objectionable evidence is with-
drawn from the jury's consideration by appropriate instructions
from the trial judge, any error in the admission of the evidence is
cured .... In like manner, improper argument or remarks by
counsel are usually cured by appropriate instructions by the court
to the jury. . . .. Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony about
which defendant complains was erroneously admitted, there was
no prejudice because of the curative instructions which the jury
received. 10
7
The necessity for a special objection to a witness being quali-
fied as an expert was demonstrated in State v. Edwards.108 A dep-
uty sheriff testified that he had checked the brakes on a particular
car after Nance was in custody. The deputy stated that the brakes
worked properly and that there was sufficient brake fluid in the
106. Id. at 687-88, 273 S.E.2d at 267-68. Sometimes it is appropriate for a
judge to give an instruction to the jury on how to deal with objections in language
similar to that of California:
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not
speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for
the objection. You must not consider for any purpose an offer of evidence
that was rejected, or any evidence that was stricken out by the court;
such matter is to be treated as though you had never known of it. You
must never speculate to be true any insinuation suggested by a question
to a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it
supplies meaning to an answer.
B.A.J.I.-Civil, § 1.02, 7 (1977 revision).
107. 301 N.C. 683, 688, 273 S.E.2d 264, 268 (1980).
108. 49 N.C. App. 547, 272 S.E.2d 384 (1980).
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car. ' Only a general objection was lodged. On appeal, the defen-
dant contended that because the officer had not been qualified as
an expert in automobile mechanics, he should not have been per-
mitted to testify about the condition of the brakes. In overruling
this contention, the Court of Appeals noted:
Defendant only interposed a general objection and did not make
a special request to have the deputy qualified as an expert. This
was insufficient to preserve an exception for our review. "Objec-
tion to a witness' qualification as an expert is waived if not made
in apt time on this special ground, even though general objection
is taken." [citations omitted] The deputy was also permited to
testify on this same subject on redirect examination without ob-
jection. Thus, even if a general objection had been sufficient, its
benefit was lost when substantially the same evidence was there-
after admitted without renewed objection .... 10
Many objection hearings reach a point at which the losing
counsel will say, "Well, Judge, if you say it is not worded right,
then please tell me how you want it worded, and I will say it that
way." This invitation for the judge to become an educator brought
this hot retort from the nostrils of the winning counsel: "Judge, I
object to your quarterbacking for him. He is supposed to know and
follow the same rules of evidence that I have to follow. It isn't fair
to my client for you to tell him how to try his case." My response
is that the judge is in control of the case, that at least the offering
counsel is entitled to hear the "grounds" for the objection from the
opposing side, that the judge can tell why the question is objec-
tionable, but that the judge is not required to tell counsel how to
reword a question or how to offer a proper foundation. In actuality,
the law requires the judge to make only a ruling on an objection.
The judge is not required to give reasons for his ruling on an objec-
tion. It sometimes helps the appellate division to know the reason-
ing of the judge in order for the objection to be sustained on ap-
peal, but the North Carolina rules of evidence are silent on any
requirement for the judge to give a dissertation on the law every
time he rules on an objection. Sometimes the judge may be right in
his ruling even though he may offer the wrong reason.
109. Id. at 557, 272 S.E.2d at 391.
110. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Conformity to established procedure is the life blood of a
smooth flowing trial. The cohesion and coherence of a trial is bled
off when counsel abuse the use of objections. A proper use of objec-
tions reveals the merits of a case to the sunlight of the jury's
scrutiny.
An orderly trial, free from needless objections, is void of un-
necessary delay, bickering, or the pursuit of tangential issues, and
centers on a quest for the whole truth. To meet this end counsel
must deal with objections in a professional manner. In addition,
the trial judge must be proficient in making his rulings on the
admissibility of evidence in order for the trial system to reach its
full potential.
As long as compliance with the rules of evidence contribute
substantially to the final outcome of a case, and as long as any
litigant can embark upon a rummage for error on appeal, the right
to object will remain a vital and practical part of trial practice.
Objections cannot be abolished as long as exclusionary rules exist.
The best way to communicate the litigant's case to the judge and
the jury, however, is to use techniques that seek to eliminate con-
flict, reduce delay, and muzzle the dog pound quarrel.
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